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Abstract
The breakdown of semantic knowledge relative to living and non-living categories was studied in patients with Alzheimer’s disease
(AD). The same living and non-living items were used in a semantic battery and in a semantic priming paradigm exploring automatic access
to the semantic system. Although AD patients showed a semantic deficit on the intentional semantic battery, they demonstrated normal
semantic facilitation on the priming task. In the AD group as a whole, the semantic impairment did not preferentially affect the living
category either in the intentional or automatic condition. Instead, a prevalent deficit for the living category was found in three AD patients
(14% of the group) on the intentional semantic tasks, but not on the automatic one. These findings support the view that the category effect
may not be a generalised phenomenon in AD but may be restricted to a limited number of patients. The intentional/automatic dissociation
of the semantic breakdown demonstrated by AD patients is discussed in relation to different theories regarding the organisation of semantic
memory.
© 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The semantic memory deficit is an important component
of cognitive decline in patients with Alzheimer’s disease
(AD) (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1983; Martin & Fedio, 1983).
The breakdown of semantic memory is considered the
main cause of their poor performance on a variety of tasks
such as Naming, Verbal Fluency and Object Recognition
tasks or tests probing knowledge of concept meaning (see
Salmon, Butters, & Chan, 1999 for a review). Although
the semantic memory impairment is well documented even
in the early stages of the disease, its exact characteristics
are still a matter of debate. One of the most controversial
issues is whether the semantic damage in AD preferen-
tially affects a specific-category of knowledge. Contrasting
data have been reported in this regard. In fact, some find-
ings actually support a selective semantic impairment for
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the categories of living beings (Daum, Riesch, Sartori, &
Birbaumer, 1996; Mazzoni, Moretti, Lucchini, Vista, &
Muratorio, 1991; Montanes, Goldblum, & Boller, 1995;
Silveri, Daniele, Giustolisi, & Gainotti, 1991), while other
studies report a homogeneous impairment of these two cat-
egories of knowledge (Gainotti, Di Betta, & Silveri, 1996;
Hodges, Salmon, & Butters, 1992; Montanes, Goldblum,
& Boller, 1996; Tippett, Grossman, & Farah, 1996) in AD
patients.
Several different hypotheses have been advanced to ac-
count for the inconsistency of reported findings regarding
the category effect in the semantic impairment of AD pa-
tients. Tippett et al. (1996) sustained that AD does not gener-
ally cause a selective category-specific deficit and that when
such a deficit occurs it is likely an artefact due to imper-
fectly matched living/non-living stimuli sets. This claim is
based on the finding that intrinsic properties of words such
as familiarity, prototypicality and frequency of occurrence
are generally lower for living than for non-living things
(Funnell & Sheridan, 1992; Hodges et al., 1992) and, in con-
trast, visual complexity is often greater for living than for
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non-living items (Gaffan & Heywood, 1993). Accordingly,
performance on living things is intrinsically “more difficult”
than on non-living things and, therefore, is more suscepti-
ble to errors following brain damage. As a matter of fact,
Tippett et al. (1996) demonstrated that if confounding fac-
tors inherent in tested items are equated, then differences
in the performance of AD patients on living and non-living
categories are no longer apparent.
Other authors have advanced different hypotheses to
explain the inconstant presence of category effects in AD
patients’ semantic deficit. Garrard, Patterson, Watson, and
Hodges (1998) and Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler,
and Seidenberg (1997) posited that the living/non-living dis-
sociation in the semantic memory impairment of AD patients
is genuine but may affect individual patients in opposite
ways. Thus, some patients may suffer from a prevalent dif-
ficulty with living beings and others may show the reversed
pattern, that is, more severe impairment for non-living
things. Therefore, in an AD sample when the number of
cases with a prevalent impairment for living things prevails
over cases with the opposite dissociation, then a significant
effect with better average performance on non-living things
is manifested. In contrast, when the proportion of cases
showing the two opposite patterns of category dissociation
is roughly comparable in an AD sample, then the group
analysis fails to demonstrate any category effect.
Although Garrard et al. (1998) and Gonnerman et al.
(1997) share the assumption that the semantic impairment
in AD patients may result in a category dissociation that
alternatively penalises living or non-living items, their in-
terpretation of this phenomenon is different. According to
Garrard et al. (1998), it is an expression of the variability
of the AD pathology that most frequently prevails in the
temporo-limbic regions, thus resulting in a prevalent im-
pairment for the living category. However, occasionally it
predominantly involves the fronto-parietal regions, thus ac-
counting for the prevalent non-living deficit in a minority
of AD patients. This claim is based on the hypothesis ad-
vanced by some authors (Gainotti, 1990; Silveri et al., 1991;
Warrington & Shallice, 1984) that the temporo-limbic struc-
tures are critically involved in the processing of percep-
tual information, supposed to be particularly important for
the identification of living things, and, conversely, that the
fronto-parietal regions are specialised for the representation
of functional knowledge, assumed to be crucial for the iden-
tification of non-living things.
Instead, Gonnerman et al. (1997) rejected the explana-
tions of category selective deficits in AD patients based
on the role of different specialised anatomical regions and
sustained that such category effects occur because of the
intrinsic differences in the conceptual representation of liv-
ing and non-living things within a connectionist model of
semantic memory. Such models view semantic knowledge
as a distributed and interconnected network of units repre-
senting different features of individual concepts. According
to Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, and Seidenberg’s (1998)
and Gonnerman et al.’s (1997) models, living things are
represented by many shared and inter-correlated semantic
features (that is, features shared by several category mem-
bers and that regularly co-occur in different concepts), while
non-living things are represented by a greater proportion of
distinctive features that are less correlated. In this kind of
model, shared features are thought to be more resistant to
degenerative damage than distinctive ones, because they are
sustained by strong collateral support within a set of more
inter-correlated features. Based on the assumption that cate-
gory effects arise from damage to a unitary semantic system
in which concepts in different categories are structured in
different ways, the existence of selective deficits either for
non-living or living things in AD patients is explained as a
function of different stages of pathology. In the early stages
of a widespread pathology such as AD, the more vulnera-
ble distinctive features are predominantly affected, thus re-
sulting in a selective semantic deficit for non-living things.
However, as the disease progresses, the degradation of entire
sets of shared and inter-correlated features implies a catas-
trophic loss of knowledge of living things, thus producing a
prevalent deficit for living items.
A final hypothesis regarding the inconsistent emergence
of a category effect in the performance of AD patients on se-
mantic memory tasks was proposed by Daum et al. (1996).
These authors showed that discrepancies in experimental
findings regarding AD patients’ specific-category deficits
could depend on the nature and, more specifically, on the
degree of effortful processing required by the task. In their
study, a group of AD patients performed worse on living than
non-living items only on those tasks requiring an effortful
access to semantic concepts, such as confrontation naming
with and without cues, semantic knowledge probes or defini-
tions of concepts. In other less demanding tasks, such as an
object decision task (in which subjects were asked to decide
whether a picture represented a real or an unreal object) or
a preference judgement task (in which subjects were asked
to express a preference between one real and one unreal
item), AD patients not only performed better overall than on
the previous tasks, but they performed at the same level on
living and non-living items. Daum et al. (1996) interpreted
these results in light of Nebes et al. proposal (Nebes, Brady,
& Huff, 1989; Nebes, Martin, & Horn, 1984) that the se-
mantic impairment in AD patients is due to the inability to
consciously access or retrieve otherwise spared semantic in-
formation which, instead, can be available when implicitly
assessed. Consequently, such a deficit, most probably related
to generalised attention and executive deficits, may not be
evident in low task demand conditions, in which semantic
information can be accessed or retrieved automatically, but
it becomes evident when the experimental paradigm calls
for a more intentional (i.e. effortful) retrieval strategy.
A similar explanation can be proposed for the significant
category effect found in the performance of AD patients in
effortful but not in low demand semantic tasks. Indeed, since
items belonging to living categories are intrinsically more
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difficult than non-living ones (Funnell & Sheridan, 1992;
Gainotti et al., 1996; Tippett et al., 1996), then intentionally
accessing them may be particularly difficult for AD patients,
thus giving rise to a specific-category effect. Instead, auto-
matic access to semantic information, typical of low demand
tasks, may overcome the AD patients’ processing difficul-
ties, thus obscuring any semantic category dissociation.
To summarise, this brief review of the literature high-
lights the different factors that may account for the inconsis-
tent emergence of category-specific effects in the semantic
impairment of AD patients. These include the following:
(a) the different intrinsic characteristics of the living and
non-living items utilised in the semantic tasks (Tippett et al.,
1996); (b) the simultaneous presence of individuals disso-
ciating in opposite directions in the selected AD patients’
sample (Garrard et al., 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997); (c)
the different kinds of access to semantic knowledge, either
automatic or intentional, required by the experimental task
(Daum et al., 1996).
The aim of this study was to verify the influence such
different factors may have on the emergence of category
deficits in a sample of AD patients. In particular, intentional
access to semantic knowledge was evaluated by means of
a battery of tests that included Naming and Comprehension
tasks and a Questionnaire exploring different levels of se-
mantic knowledge. Data regarding frequency, prototypical-
ity, visual complexity, name and image agreement and other
potentially confounding factors were available for both the
living and non-living items of the battery. This made it pos-
sible to analyse the performances of AD patients and normal
subjects after partialling out the possible influence of these
factors on performance accuracy. In order to investigate the
presence of patients dissociating in opposite directions in the
AD sample, a performance analysis of the individual cases
as well as of the overall group was carried out. Finally, to
evaluate automatic access to semantic knowledge, we used
a lexical decision semantic priming task. Semantic priming
is an experimental paradigm classically used to investigate
the semantic store with a minimal demand for attentional
resources. It consists of subjects’ response times (for exam-
ple, on Naming or Lexical Decision Tasks), which are faster
to target words following a semantically related prime word
than to target words following a non-related prime or a neu-
tral prime (i.e. a string of XXX (Neely, 1977), or the word
BLANK (Chenery, Ingram, & Murdoch, 1994; Chertkow
et al., 1994; Hartman, 1991)). Faster response time to re-
lated than to unrelated prime-target pairs is generally be-
lieved to reflect the spreading activation from the prime to
the concepts that share a semantic relationship with it in
the semantic store (Collins & Loftus, 1975). The priming
effect is automatic, that is it occurs rapidly and is not af-
fected by preparatory strategies or expectations, when the
interval between the presentation of the prime and the tar-
get, known as stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), is brief
(<400 ms), and the percentage of related prime-target pairs
is low (usually around 20% of trials). Instead, intentional
(i.e. strategy-based) attentional processes may contribute to
semantic priming when longer SOAs or a higher proportion
of related pairs are used (Neely, 1977, 1991). Besides facil-
itating the related condition compared to the unrelated and
neutral ones, intentional priming paradigms also determine
slower reaction times (RTs) for the unrelated than the neutral
condition. This is because strategies based on the expecta-
tion of a related target inhibit response times to an unrelated
target. Automatic priming paradigms, instead, produce only
facilitation for the related condition with respect to the un-
related one, while response times to unrelated and neutral
conditions do not differ.
In the present study, the primes of the associated pairs, al-
ternatively belonging to living or non-living categories, were
derived from the semantic battery; thus, intentional and au-
tomatic access to semantic knowledge was evaluated rela-
tive to the same items. Moreover, since we were interested
in investigating non-intentional access to semantic knowl-
edge, experimental parameters were set out to obtain an au-
tomatic form of priming (i.e. short SOA and low proportion
of related prime-target pairs).
2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Twenty-one subjects suffering from AD (15 females and
6 males; mean age = 70.7 years, S.D. = 5.8; mean years of
education = 9.2; S.D. = 4.7) participated in this study. All
subjects met the clinical criteria established by the National
Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and
Stroke-Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Associ-
ation (McKhann et al., 1984) for probable Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. Their medical history, neurological examination, brain
imaging and laboratory tests provided assurance that their
dementia symptoms could be not attributed to an illness
other than AD. The AD group was constituted by subjects
with mild to moderate levels of dementia (mean score on the
Mini mental state examination = 21.1; S.D. = 2.9; range
16.5–26.9; mean score on clinical dementia rating scale =
1.1; S.D. = 0.4; range 0.5–2).
A group of 23 age- and education-matched normal con-
trols (NCs) (17 females and 6 males; mean age = 68.0 years,
S.D. = 10.0; mean years of education = 10.3; S.D. = 5.0)
performed the semantic priming task; 13 of these subjects
were also submitted to the intentional semantic battery.
Informed written consent was obtained from all partici-
pants and patients’ caregivers prior to the study.
2.2. Tasks
2.2.1. Battery for the evaluation of category-specific
semantic deficits
This battery, devised by Laiacona, Barbarotto, Trivelli,
and Capitani (1993), consists of a pictures Comprehension
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task, a picture Naming task and a multiple-choice format
Questionnaire. Six semantic categories are investigated,
three of living things (fruits, vegetables and animals) and
three of non-living things (vehicles, furniture and tools).
The 60 linear drawings (10 from each of six categories) used
as targets for the Naming task and as targets and distractors
for the Comprehension task were taken from Snodgrass and
Vanderwart’s series (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980).
In the Comprehension task, subjects are asked to indicate
the picture that corresponds to the one named by the experi-
menter out of five vertically placed alternatives. Distractors
are four pictures belonging to the same semantic category
(each pictures appeared an equal number of times as dis-
tractor). Each correct response scores 1 point (0–60).
For the Naming task, subjects are requested to name all
60 pictures; each correct response scores 1 point (0–60).
For each item of the verbal Questionnaire (e.g. apple) sub-
jects are requested to answer six questions in a forced-choice
response format with three alternatives. The first two ques-
tions pertain to superordinate information (one general su-
perordinate (e.g. Is it an animal, a plant or an object?) and
one in which the choice is within the living or non-living do-
main (e.g. Is it a tree, a vegetable or a fruit?)), two concern
subordinate perceptual attributes (e.g. Is it round, oblong or
conical?) and the last two concern subordinate functional
attributes including any non-perceptual feature (e.g. Do we
eat it raw, dried or in both ways?). Because of the length of
the task, we decided to utilise only the 30 items correspond-
ing to those used in the semantic priming task (see below).
Each correct response scores 1 point (0–180).
Since performance on the semantic battery can be influ-
enced by a number of intrinsic properties of the specific
items, Laiacona and co-workers (Barbarotto, Capitani, &
Laiacona, 1996; Capitani, Laiacona, & Barbarotto, 1993;
Laiacona, Barbarotto, Trivelli, & Capitani, 1993; Laiacona
et al., 1993) suggested analysing performances by means of
regression analyses in which response accuracy for single
items of the Comprehension, Naming or Questionnaire tasks
is co-varied for a number of intrinsic properties of words or
pictures.
The word properties taken into account are:
(a) Frequency of the stimulus words in the Italian lexicon
(Bortolini, Tagliavini, & Zampolli, 1971) after logarith-
mic transformation.
(b) Prototypicality of the stimulus word according to Battig
and Montague (1969). In their study, 442 normal con-
trols were given a limited amount of time to name as
many items as possible belonging to a given category.
The frequency of each item was recorded as a measure
of its prototypicality.
(c) Familiarity of the stimulus according to Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980). Subjects were asked to rate how
usual or unusual the concept of the given item was in
their realm of experience on a 5-point scale (1 = very
familiar).
The following intrinsic properties of the pictures are con-
sidered:
(a) Name agreement, i.e. the percentage of times each name
was given by the Italian control sample (Laiacona et al.,
1993).
(b) Image agreement according to Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980). Subjects were asked to indicate
how closely each picture corresponded to their own
mental image of the item on a 5-point scale (1 = low
agreement).
(c) Visual complexity according to Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980). The amount of detail or intricacy
of lines in the picture was judged on a 5-point scale
(1 = very simple).
Finally, since the difficulty of single questions on the
Questionnaire varies in an unpredictable way, thus consti-
tuting another variable potentially able to influence response
accuracy on single items, another intrinsic property of the
items on this task was a difficulty index. This was obtained
by asking 10 young, well-educated subjects to rate the diffi-
culty of each question on a 5-point scale (1 = very difficult)
(Laiacona et al., 1993).
Regarding the Naming and Comprehension tasks, there
is significantly lower familiarity for living than non-living
things (t = 3.73, P < 0.001); there is also a trend for livings
things to have a lower occurrence frequency value (t =
1.83; P = 0.07) and a higher image agreement value (t =
1.86; P = 0.07); the difference between items in the two
semantic domains did not approach statistical significance
for any of the other variables. Regarding the Questionnaire
(for which the number of items was halved), there was a
nearly significant lower level of difficulty (t = 1.91; P =
0.06) for items referring to the non-living category. The
difference between the other variables in the two semantic
domains did not approach significance.
2.2.2. Semantic priming on lexical decision task
Two semantic priming experiments were developed, one
for the living and one for the non-living category.
2.2.2.1. Material. The 60 items of the previous seman-
tic battery were utilised to create the semantically related
word/word pairs. For this purpose, we submitted the entire
list of 60 words constituting each item of the semantic bat-
tery to 60 university students. The lists, printed in columns
on three sheets of paper, corresponded to three different ran-
dom orders of the words. For each word, the subjects were
requested to write down the first associate that came to mind.
Thirty related prime-target pairs were created by associ-
ating a word (target) chosen from the three most frequently
produced by the 60 university students for that specific item
with each word on the list (prime). Fifteen primes belonged
to the living category and 15 to the non-living one. The
30 associated targets concerned both category co-ordinates
(e.g. onion–garlic) and perceptual or functional properties
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(e.g. pepper-red or train-trip) of the primes in comparable
numbers for each category. The equal presence in the two
categories of prime-target pairs linked by these two levels of
semantic knowledge (co-ordinate and attribute) made it pos-
sible to exclude that the differences in the priming effects
between the two domains were due to the different number
of properties shared by the prime and the target in the two
living and non-living sets of items (Giffard et al., 2002).
As previously noted, prime words of the semantic priming
task were also used as stimulus items for the Questionnaire
task. Accordingly, prime words for the living and non-living
pairs did not differ for frequency of occurrence, familiarity
and prototypicality. Living and non-living pairs were also
chosen so that they were comparable for frequency of asso-
ciation (mean number of subjects who produced that asso-
ciation for living pairs = 22.4, S.D. = 7.7; for non-living
pairs = 20.9, S.D. = 11.2). Finally, target words were com-
parable for frequency of occurrence in the Italian lexicon
(living: mean 34.6 per million, S.D. 45.5; non-living: mean
46.9 per million, S.D. 48.7) and length (all words ranged
from 3 to 10 letter with a mean of 5.33 letters for the liv-
ing condition (S.D. 1.23) and 5.6 letters (S.D. 1.35) for the
non-living condition).
For the experiment with living things, 15 unrelated
word/word pairs were created using the target words of the
associated pairs and replacing the prime with a different un-
related word. The latter also belonged to a living category,
matched for frequency and length with the prime word. Fif-
teen neutral word/word pairs were constituted by the word
NULLA (BLANK in Italian) as prime and the same target
as the associated pairs. We utilised the word NULLA in the
prime position instead of a string of XXX to avoid atten-
tional problems in the shift from linguistic to non-linguistic
processing during the task (see Silveri, Monteleone, Burani,
& Tabossi, 1996 for a discussion of this issue).
Thirty word/legal-pseudoword pairs were created using
the prime words of the previous related and unrelated stimuli
in the prime position, and 15 word/legal-pseudoword pairs
were created using the word NULLA in prime position.
Legal-pseudowords were created by replacing one or two
letters of real words.
Finally, to increase the total number of stimuli, 30 filler
pairs, comprised of 15 unrelated word/word pairs and 15
word/legal-pseudoword pairs, were created. The related
pairs represented 12.5% of the total number of word/word
pairs. The probability of encountering a word versus a
pseudoword in the target position was 50%.
With the same criteria described for the experiment with
living things, 15 unrelated word/word pairs, 15 NULLA/
word pairs, 30 word/pseudoword pairs, 15 NULLA/
pseudowords pairs, 15 word/word filler pairs and 15 word/
pseudoword filler pairs were created for the non-living ex-
periment. Also in this case, the related pairs represented
12.5% of the total number of word–word pairs and the prob-
ability of encountering a word rather than a pseudoword in
the target position was 50%.
For both the living and non-living experiments, stimuli
were divided into 3 blocks of 40 pairs per block containing
an equal number of Related, Unrelated and Neutral pairs, an
equal number of word/pseudoword pairs and filler pairs. A
particular target word appeared three times in the Related,
Unrelated and Neutral condition, always in a different block.
The computer program randomised the order of presentation
of the stimulus pairs inside a particular block. The order of
presentation of each block varied in a pseudorandom fashion
from subject to subject.
2.2.2.2. Procedure. The experiments were run individu-
ally and controlled by a PC 386. The stimuli were presented
in white capital letters in the centre of a black computer
screen and occupied about 5.7 degrees of visual angle. Each
trial started with the presentation of a small central cross for
2000 ms, indicating the fixation point. The cross was then
followed by the prime word, which remained for 300 ms and
was immediately replaced by the target, which remained un-
til the subject responded or, in the case of lack of response,
for 5000 ms and was then replaced by the empty black com-
puter screen. The experimenter controlled the beginning of
each trial by pressing a key on the computer keyboard. Sub-
jects were placed approximately 50 cm from the computer
screen and were instructed to silently read the prime and to
perform a lexical decision task on the target. They had to
press a red button for words and a green button for pseu-
dowords with their dominant hand (the right hand for all
patients and control subjects who participated in this study).
The red button was always placed to the right of the sub-
ject and the green button to the left. During the experiment,
subjects had to keep their dominant hand between the two
buttons and move it towards one or the other at the mo-
ment of responding. If the subjects pressed the wrong but-
ton, the mistake was indicated by an auditory signal. The
PC recorded response reaction times and accuracy. Perform-
ing the entire semantic priming task required about 30 min.
Half of the subjects performed the experiment with living
things first and then with non-living things; the other half
performed the experiments in the reverse order. There was
an interval of 10 min between the two semantic priming ex-
periments. Instead, there were no intervals between blocks
within each experiment.
To ensure that each patient was able to perform the se-
mantic priming task, the experimental session was preceded
by a reading and a pre-test priming task. The reading task
consisted of 20 words, matched for frequency and length
to those of the experimental stimuli. Each word was pre-
sented in white capital letters on the centre of the black
computer screen for 300 ms, preceded by a small central
cross for 2000 ms. The pre-test priming task consisted of 10
word/word pairs and 10 word/legal-pseudoword pairs, with
the same characteristics of length and frequency as the exper-
imental pairs; they were presented with the same procedure
as the experimental task. This task was preceded by some
practice trials. Patients who were not able to read at least
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18 words in the reading task and to make at least 18 correct
lexical decisions in the pre-test priming task were excluded
from the study. Of the 43 patients initially recruited for the
study, only the 21 from the experimental group reached the
cut-off score on both pre-experimental tasks and were in-
cluded in the study.
The recruitment requirement of a high performance level
on the lexical decision task was to ensure that no deficits
in the priming effect could be attributed to the AD patients’
inability to access the semantic store through a degraded
input lexicon. Indeed, although lexical decision tasks can
be performed only by relying on lexical (i.e. non-semantic)
knowledge, the facilitation that primes produce on the lexical
decision latency for related targets can be assumed to be
semantically mediated. According to interactive spreading
activation models of language (McClelland & Rumelhart,
1981), which assume a continuous feedback between more
central and peripheral components of language mechanisms,
the prime-related target facilitation should be based on the
partial activation of the target in the input lexicon due to
the number of features that it shares with the prime at the
semantic level (Chertkow & Bub, 1989).
2.2.2.3. Testing sessions. Each subject was submitted
to two testing sessions: in the first session, the entire in-
tentional semantic battery was administered (the order of
administration of the Comprehension, Naming and Ques-
tionnaire tasks was counterbalanced between subjects); in
the second one (the next day) the semantic priming experi-
ments.
3. Results
3.1. Battery to evaluate category-specific semantic
deficits
3.1.1. Comparison of group performances
Mean performance accuracy obtained by AD patients
and NCs on the living and non-living items of the Nam-
ing, Comprehension and Questionnaire tasks are shown in
Table 1 (one patient in the AD group did not fill in the
Questionnaire, so the results for this task are averaged on 20
patients).
Table 1
Mean (and S.D.) scores obtained by AD patients and NCs on Naming, Comprehension and Questionnaire (superordinate and subordinate questions) for
both living and non-living condition
Group Category Naming (max 30) Comprehension (max 30) Questionnaire
Superordinate (max 30) Subordinate (max 30)a
AD Living 21.9 (6.9) 28.2 (2.7) 27.5 (2.9 ) 25.6 (4.8)
Non-living 23.3 (6.9) 28.8 (1.7) 28.8 (2.5) 27.5 (4.5)
NCs Living 27.9 (1.8) 30.0 (0.0) 29.0 (1.5) 28.8 (1.6)
Non-living 28.5 (1.1) 29.9 (0.2) 29.9 (0.6) 29.5 (0.7)
a The mean scores were halved in this condition in order to equate them to the superordinate ones.
3.1.2. Naming and Comprehension
Performance scores for Naming and Comprehension tasks
were submitted to a two-way MANOVA with Group (AD
patients and NCs) as between factor and Category (living
and non-living) as within factor. In each task, a significant
Group effect emerged (Naming: F = 9.5, P < 0.05 with
1, 32 d.f.; Comprehension: F = 6.5, P < 0.05 with 1,
32 d.f.). However, both the Category effect (F = 2.1 with
1, 32 d.f. and F = 0.4 with 1, 32 d.f. for the Naming
and Comprehension tasks, respectively) and the Group ×
Category interaction (F = 0.3 with 1, 32 d.f. and F =
0.8 with 1, 32 d.f., respectively) were non-significant in
the two tasks. This result shows that, although AD patients
performed worse than NCs on Naming and Comprehension
tasks, the two groups performed at the same level on both
tasks on living and non-living items.
3.1.3. Questionnaire
Since some authors have suggested that the semantic
degradation in AD patients may mostly affect the dis-
tinctive features of concepts, while information shared by
several concepts is relatively spared (Gonnerman et al.,
1997; Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, & Bunn, 1998), the
analysis of the Questionnaire scores considered the mean
performance accuracy obtained by AD patients and NCs
separately on the superordinate and subordinate questions.
To equate the number of responses obtained on the two
types of questions, the subordinate ones were halved. A
three-way MANOVA was performed with Group (AD pa-
tients and NCs) as between Factor and Category (living and
non-living) and Type of question (superordinate and sub-
ordinate) as within factors. The Group effect approached
significance (F = 3.9, P = 0.057, d.f. 1, 31); infact, AD
patients (average accuracy: 27.39) performed substantially
worse than NCs (average accuracy: 29.31). The Category
(F = 20.6, P < 0.001 with 1, 31 d.f.) and the kind of
question effects (F = 7.2, P < 0.01, d.f. 1, 31) were also
significant, due to the better performance on non-living
(mean 28.96) than on living items (mean 27.75) and on
superordinate (mean 28.83) than on subordinate questions
(mean 27.87) by the overall group of subjects. The lack
of a significant Group × Category interaction (F = 20.6
with 1, 31 d.f.) indicated that performance on living items
was equally more difficult for AD patients and NCs than
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performance on non-living ones. Instead, a trend toward a
significant interaction between Group × Type of question
emerged (F = 3.3, P = 0.08, d.f. 1, 31). Indeed, while AD
patients performed at a level comparable to that of NCs on
the superordinate questions (average accuracy = 28.2 and
29.4, respectively) (F = 2.7, P = n.s. with 1, 31 d.f.), they
performed worse than NCs on the subordinate questions
(average accuracy = 26.5 and 29.1, respectively) (F = 4.2,
P = 0.05, with 1, 31 d.f.). The lack of any other significant
interaction indicated that the relative sparing on the super-
ordinate and the impairment on the subordinate questions
in the AD group was present equally in the two semantic
categories of knowledge.
3.1.4. Multiple regression analyses of group
performances
As previously discussed, a number of intrinsic properties
of words (i.e. Frequency, Familiarity and Prototypicality)
and pictures (Name Agreement, Image Agreement and
Visual Complexity) and also the difficulty rate of single
questions on the Questionnaire can influence performance
accuracy on the semantic battery tasks. Some of these
variables assume substantially different average values in
semantic battery items belonging to living or non-living
categories. To assess the actual role played by the living/
non-living dichotomy in predicting performance accuracy
on single items, and to rule out the possible confound-
ing influence of intrinsic properties of pictures, words and
questions, Capitani et al. (1993) suggested analysing per-
formance on these tasks by means of regression analyses.
Therefore, separate stepwise multiple regression analyses
were first performed for the AD and NC groups and for each
of the semantic tasks. In each of these analyses, the average
successful Naming, Comprehension or Question response to
single items achieved by the whole group was the dependent
variable and living or non-living category (coded as dummy
variable (Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973)), Frequency, Proto-
typicality and Familiarity of the individual items were the
independent variables. Additional independent variables for
the Naming and Comprehension tasks were Name Agree-
ment, Image Agreement and Visual Complexity, and for
the Questionnaire they were difficulty index of individual
questions and type of question. Since the statistical units in
each of these regression analyses were represented by the
task items (60, 60 and 180 for Comprehension, Naming and
Questionnaire, respectively), there was a ratio of 7.5 cases
for each variable introduced for the regression analyses per-
formed on Comprehension and Naming tasks, and a ratio of
30 cases for each variable studied in the Questionnaire anal-
ysis. These ratios were above the minimum ratio of at least
five cases per variable usually requested in multiple regres-
sion analyses (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Balch, 1998).
For both Naming and Comprehension tasks, the cate-
gory of the individual items did not contribute to the pre-
diction of response accuracy for either the AD or the NC
group.
As for the performance of AD patients on the Question-
naire, the first independent variable to enter in the equa-
tion was question difficulty with a multiple R of 0.50 (R2
change = 0.25; F = 62.1; P < 0.001). In the second
step of the regression analysis, a significant contribution to-
ward predicting the dependent variable was made by the
living/non-living dichotomy with a multiple R of 0.55 (R2
change = 0.05; F = 13.1; P < 0.001). When forced to
enter the regression equation, none of the remaining inde-
pendent variables contributed significantly toward predict-
ing the dependent variable. Substantially similar results were
obtained with NCs. Also in this case, the first indepen-
dent variable to enter the equation was question difficulty
with a multiple R of 0.28 (R2 change = 0.08; F = 15.6;
P < 0.001) followed by the living/non-living dichotomy in
the second step (R = 0.32; R2 change = 0.02; F = 4.4;
P = 0.036). No other independent variables entered the
equation.
3.1.5. Logistic regression analyses of single subject’s
performance
Gonnerman et al. (1997) and Garrard et al. (1998) pro-
posed that a specific-category deficit might not be evident
in the AD group because of a possible double dissocia-
tion with some patients showing the expected prevalent im-
pairment for the living category and others the opposite
dissociation penalising the non-living category. In order to
highlight possible individual dissociations, we submitted in-
dividual performances of subjects in the AD and NC groups
on the Naming, Comprehension and Questionnaire tasks to
logistic regression analysis (Laiacona et al., 1993). In each
of these analyses, the dependent variable was represented
by the performance accuracy of the individual patient on the
single items (coded as 0 or 1) while the same intrinsic prop-
erties of words, pictures and questions considered before in
the multiple regression analyses were the co-variates. One
AD patient (CE) showed a significant category effect on all
three tasks with disproportionately worse performances on
living items than on non-living ones; another patient (DE)
performed significantly worse on living than on non-living
items on Naming and on the Questionnaire; and four patients
(CL, GR, MA and TR) showed a category effect with poorer
performances on living than on non-living things only on
the Questionnaire.
The logistic regression analyses applied to individ-
ual NCs’ performances revealed that in no case did the
living/non-living dichotomy significantly contribute to the
prediction of Naming and Comprehension performances.
Instead, the category effect was significant for predict-
ing performance on the Questionnaire in three cases with
performance on living items consistently worse than on
non-living ones.
In order to verify whether the disadvantage for living
items shown by the six AD patients was the same as that
displayed by the NCs or whether it was disproportionately
larger, we computed the t scores for each subject relative
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to the living/non-living independent variable resulting from
the logistic regression analyses made on the performance
of each NC subject on the three tasks. The t score can be
considered a standardised index of each subject’s trend to
perform better in one category than the other because it
takes into account the confounding effects exerted by intrin-
sic properties of words and pictures. The direction of the t
(positive or negative) is indicative of the category in which
the subject performed better (living or non-living, respec-
tively) and the magnitude of the t-value is indicative of the
entity of this advantage (t = 0 corresponding to an identical
performance in the two categories). We utilised the mean of
the t scores obtained by NCs + 3 S.D. in the Naming and
Questionnaire tasks as the normal cut-off of the advantage
on non-living items with respect to living ones on these two
tasks (NCs’ Naming mean t score = 0.43, S.D. 0.53, cut-off
2.08; NCs’ Questionnaire mean t score = 0.43, S.D. 0.77,
cut-off 2.74) (the Comprehension task was not considered in
this case because all NCs performed at or close to the ceil-
ing). Such a high cut-off of normality was adopted to ensure
that the AD patients’ category asymmetries above the nor-
mal cut-off were not simply due to chance as a consequence
of the high number of logistic regressions performed on the
individual data. On the Naming task, the two AD patients
with a significant disadvantage for living things in the re-
gression analysis both had a t score above the normal cut-off
Fig. 1. Distribution of individual AD patients’ t-values for the category effect on the Naming (panels a and b) and Questionnaire (panels c and d) as a
function of their MMSE score or overall accuracy scores on those tasks. Dot lines show the cut-off scores considered as normal for the disadvantage on
living items.
(CE: t = 2.36 and DE: t = 2.36); moreover, two of the six
patients with a significant disadvantage for living things in
the regression analysis of the Questionnaire data also had
a t score above the normal cut-off (CE: t = 3.04 and GR:
t = 3.02). To conclude, in three AD patients of our sample
(14%) the disadvantage for living things exceeded what we
expected simply based on the normal subjects’ performance.
3.2. Relationship between category dissociation and
severity of cognitive and lexical semantic impairment
Since some authors have suggested that the severity of
the AD pathology may be predictive of the presence of cat-
egory dissociation (Gonnerman et al., 1997), we wanted to
verify the role of the overall level of mental deterioration or
lexical–semantic impairment in the emergence of the cate-
gory effect in our sample of AD patients.
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of individual AD patient’s
t-values for the category effect on the Naming and Question-
naire tasks (as resulting from the logistic regression analy-
ses), as a function of their MMSE score or overall accuracy
scores on those tasks. In each case, the three AD patients
who showed a specific disadvantage for the living category
fell on the side of the median corresponding to more severe
impairment as measured by the distribution of MMSE or
overall Naming and Questionnaire accuracy scores.
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Table 2
Mean (and S.D.) of RTs and accuracy scores obtained by AD patients and NCs on Related, Unrelated and Neutral pairs in the semantic priming task
both for living and non-living condition
Group Category Accuracy (max = 15) RTs (ms)
Related pairs Unrelated pairs Neutral pairs Related pairs Unrelated pairs Neutral pairs
AD Living 13.7 (1.2) 13.0 (1.5) 13.6 (1.3) 1328.3 (314.6) 1347.5 (281.1) 1300.7 (268.8)
Non-living 12.9 (1.9) 13.0 (1.9) 13.0 (1.8) 1315.6 (312.4) 1390.4 (387.9) 1356.1 (332.6)
NCs Living 13.6 (1.3) 13.7 (1.3) 14.1 (1.3) 927.3 (323.1) 957.2 (388.2) 953.2 (353.0)
Non-living 13.9 (1.1) 13.8 (1.2) 13.6 (1.1) 941.3 (375.2) 1000.0 (450.4) 988.4 (470.7)
3.3. Semantic priming on lexical decision
3.3.1. Accuracy
The average number of correct lexical decisions made by
AD patients and NCs on the target words of the associated
pairs in both the living and non-living semantic priming
experiments and as a function of being preceded by a Re-
lated, Unrelated or Neutral prime are reported in Table 2.
These data were submitted to a three-way MANOVA with
Group (AD patients and NCs) as between factor, and Prim-
ing Condition (Related, Unrelated and Neutral) and Category
(living and non-living) as within factors. The difference in
accuracy between groups approached significance (F = 2.9,
P = 0.09 with 1, 41 d.f.). However, the Priming Condition,
Category effects and interactions were not significant, prob-
ably due to a ceiling effect of performance.
3.4. Response reaction times
Only reaction times on correct lexical decisions were con-
sidered for statistical analysis. In addition, trials with RTs
longer than 2 S.D. from each individual’s mean RT for that
condition were excluded from all the statistics. The average
RTs obtained by AD patients and NCs as a function of Prim-
ing Condition and Category are reported in Table 2. These
data were submitted to a three-way MANOVA with Group
(AD patients and NCs) as between factor and Priming Con-
dition (Related, Unrelated and Neutral) and Category (living
and non-living) as within factors. The results showed sig-
nificant effects of Group (F = 13.4, P < 0.001 with 1, 42
d.f.) and Priming Condition (F = 4.8, P < 0.01 with 1, 42
d.f.), but not of Category (F = 1.1, with 1, 42 d.f.). AD pa-
tients showed slower RTs (mean 1339 ms) than NCs (mean
961 ms) (F = 13.4, P < 0.001 with 1, 42 d.f.) and, in the
overall group, lexical decision in the Related condition was
significantly faster (mean 1128 ms) than in the Unrelated
one (mean 1173 ms) (F = 8.1, P = 0.006 with 1, 42 d.f.).
The Neutral condition (mean 1149 ms) did not differ from
either the Related or Unrelated ones (F = 2.2 with 1, 42
d.f. and F = 3.1 with 1, 42 d.f., respectively). The lack of
any inhibitory effect in the Unrelated condition with respect
to the Neutral one meets the generally accepted operational
criterion to consider the lexical decision facilitation exerted
by a semantic priming paradigm as automatically generated
(Neely, 1977). The non-significant Group × Priming Con-
dition interaction (F = 0.7 with 1, 42 d.f.) documented a
similar magnitude of the priming effect in the AD (46 ms)
and NC (44 ms) groups. The Priming Condition × Category
interaction was not significant (F = 2.1 with 1, 42 d.f.).
However, the priming effect for the living category (25 ms)
was substantially smaller than that for the non-living items
(67 ms) (F = 3.1, P = 0.08 with 1, 42 d.f.). Finally, the
three fold Group × Priming Condition × Category interac-
tion fell short of significance (F = 0.3, with 1, 42 d.f.),
thus documenting that such a discrepancy of priming as a
function of semantic category was of the same magnitude
in both AD and NC subjects.
To verify whether the three AD patients who showed a
specific disadvantage for the living category on the tasks of
the intentional semantic battery also displayed reduced prim-
ing for living items, a measure of inter-category discrepancy
was computed for each subject. The magnitude of prim-
ing in the pairs of the non-living category was subtracted
from that of the living pairs. Analogously to what we previ-
ously made for the tasks of the semantic battery, a normality
cut-off for this inter-category discrepancy was calculated by
adding to the mean difference in priming obtained by NCs
(−28.78 ms) 3 S.D.s (92.68; cut-off −306.8). All three pa-
tients showed a discrepancy between priming for living and
non-living pairs (33, 142.3 and −105 ms, respectively) that
was largely within the normal range.
4. Discussion
Aim of this study was to verify the possible influence of
the following factors on the emergence of category effects
in AD patients: (a) the different level of difficulty of the
living and non-living items utilised in the semantic tasks
(Tippett et al., 1996), (b) the simultaneous presence of oppo-
site category-specific semantic deficits in the AD patients of
the samples studied (Garrard et al., 1998; Gonnerman et al.,
1997) and (c) the different modality of access (automatic or
intentional) to semantic knowledge (Daum et al., 1996).
To achieve this, the performance of AD patients and NCs
was analysed on a test battery investigating intentional ac-
cess to semantic knowledge by controlling for the influ-
ence of several confounding factors inherent in the intrinsic
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properties of the items utilised. Three main results emerged
from this analysis: (1) the finding of a “physiologic” cat-
egory asymmetry (i.e. poorer performance on living than
on non-living items in healthy subjects) (2) the lack of any
category effect exceeding the asymmetry found in NCs in
the performances of the AD group as a whole and (3) the
presence of such a specific-category impairment in 14% of
the individual patients of the overall AD sample. AD pa-
tients and NCs were also submitted to an automatic seman-
tic priming experiment investigating automatic access to the
same items as those of the intentional battery. The normal
priming displayed by the AD group suggested a dissociation
between impaired intentional access and normal automatic
processing of semantic knowledge. Such a dissociation was
evident in the AD group as a whole and in the AD patients
who showed a significant category effect.
4.1. “Physiologic” category asymmetry
Although a disadvantage for the living category was only
nominal in the Naming task and absent in the Comprehen-
sion task (in which NCs generally approached the maximum
score), a category-based asymmetry penalising the items
of the living category was revealed by the performances
of NCs on the Questionnaire. Moreover, a trend toward a
“physiologic” disadvantage for the living category was also
found when automatic processing was requested in the se-
mantic priming task.
The finding of a poorer performance on living than on
non-living items in healthy subjects was not unexpected. It
was reported by Capitani, Laiacona, Barbarotto & Trivelli
(1994) on the same Naming and Questionnaire tasks used
in this study. A first explanation of this phenomenon in-
volves the generally held assumption that items of the living
categories are more difficult than those of the non-living
ones (Funnell & Sheridan, 1992). Indeed, in our corpus of
words living items were less familiar and less frequent than
non-living ones. Moreover, on the Questionnaire, queries
about living items were on average more difficult than ques-
tions about non-living things. However, the category effect
survived also when we analysed the NCs’ performances by
means of regression analyses to partial out these confound-
ing factors. Obviously, the possibility remains that other
factors might have made items belonging to the living cate-
gory more difficult to process. For example, we did not con-
sider Age of Acquisition or Imageability of the items used
in the semantic battery (even though previous studies have
documented that these factors favour living things (Lambon
Ralph, Howard, Nightingale, & Ellis, 1998; Morrison,
Chappell, & Ellis, 1997)).
A different explanation of the “physiologic” category
asymmetry derives from recent claims of discrepancies
in the way semantic representations regarding living and
non-living concepts are stored in the human brain (Devlin
et al., 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997). Recently, Garrard,
Lambon-Ralph, Hodges, & Patterson (2001) reported a
different distribution of the feature correlations across cat-
egories. Since living things have many more correlated
features than non-living things, this fact could have con-
sequences on the semantic system in both normal and
impaired circumstances (see Garrard et al. (2001) for a
detailed discussion of this issue). Furthermore, McRae, De
Sa, & Seidenberg (1997) demonstrated that in a semantic
priming task, the magnitude of item by item facilitation was
predicted by similarity between concepts expressed in terms
of individual features for non-living things and, conversely,
by similarity expressed in terms of correlated feature pairs
for living beings. To summarise, the presence of a qualita-
tive difference in the semantic representation of living and
non-living concepts could be another explanation (not neces-
sarily alternative to the discrepant difficulty argument) of the
living disadvantage exhibited by NCs when they access their
semantic knowledge either intentionally or automatically.
4.2. Category effect
Although the AD patients examined in this study were
impaired on all tasks of the semantic battery, the group of
patients as a whole failed to show a category asymmetry
beyond the one exhibited by NCs.
The lack of a category effect in our AD sample can not
be explained by the hypothesis that in an unselected group
of AD patients an overall category effect is obscured by
the simultaneous presence of individual cases with opposite
patterns of dissociation (Garrard et al., 1998; Gonnerman
et al., 1997). Indeed, while we found some individual cases
showing a specific disadvantage for living things, in no case
was the opposite dissociation observed. This is in striking
contrast with Garrard et al.’s, 1998 study, which reports a
significant disadvantage for non-living things in about 10%
of the AD sample. One reason for this discrepancy may be
the different degree of cognitive deterioration affecting the
two AD groups. In Garrard et al.’s study (Garrard et al.,
1998), all patients who showed a specific-category deficit
had an MMSE score of 16 or less. In the present study, the
selected AD population had a mean MMSE score of 21.1,
with a range of 16.5–26.9. This sampling bias may have pre-
vented the emergence of more cases with a disadvantage for
living things and, perhaps, even of cases with a specific dis-
advantage for artefacts (indeed the three AD patients with
a specific living impairment were among the most deterio-
rated in our sample). On the other side, the mild degree of
dementia in our AD sample may also have been responsible
for the lack of a specific deficit for the living category in the
overall group. Such considerations are largely supported by
the results of a recent study by our group (Zannino, Perri,
Carlesimo, & Caltagirone, 2002).
4.3. Intentional versus automatic access
Results indicate that our group of AD patients had intact
semantic priming. Since the same stimuli were used in both
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the semantic priming task and the intentional semantic bat-
tery, the dissociation in AD patients between normal prim-
ing and impaired performance on all tasks of the semantic
battery might not be an artefact due to imperfectly matched
stimuli sets. Regarding category effects, the primary focus
of the present study, we found that the AD patients did not
show any specific disadvantage for the living category in the
semantic priming task. This result was expected because of
the absence of a specific-category effect also in the inten-
tional semantic battery in the overall group of AD patients.
However, the three patients who showed a significant disad-
vantage for the living category on the intentional semantic
battery did not show a greater discrepancy between priming
on living and non-living pairs than the NCs.
Several previous studies have reported intact automatic
priming in AD patients (Hodges et al., 1992; Nebes et al.,
1984; Ober, Shenaut, Jagust, & Syillman, 1991). Different
hypotheses have been advanced to explain this finding. On
the assumption that information that does not exist cannot be
primed (Shallice, 1988), the presence of preserved seman-
tic priming in AD patients has been considered indicative of
spared semantic knowledge by some authors (Hodges et al.,
1992; Nebes et al., 1984; Ober et al., 1991). Nebes et al.
(1984) suggested that although semantic knowledge is pre-
served in AD, it is not readily accessible or usable if the
cognitive processes involved in a task make heavy demands
on attentional capacity (i.e. if the task requires intentional
retrieval), while, if the task calls primarily for automatic
processing, AD patients perform fairly normally. Accord-
ingly, the dissociation in our study between normal prim-
ing and poor performance on the semantic battery, could
be interpreted as reflecting the discrepancy between nor-
mal automatic and deficient deliberate access to semantic
information.
On the basis of Daum et al.’s findings (Daum et al., 1996),
we hypothesised that an access semantic deficit might also
be responsible for the emergence of specific-category effects
in the AD group on intentional but not on automatic seman-
tic tasks. We reasoned that in tasks relying on intentional
access to semantic information, the decreased attentional ca-
pacities of AD patients would mostly affect the more diffi-
cult items (that is, the living ones, as suggested by data in the
literature (Funnell & Sheridan, 1992; Gainotti et al., 1996;
Tippett et al., 1996) and confirmed in this study). However,
when the task provided automatic access to semantic knowl-
edge, not only were the AD patients’ overall performances
normal, but also the discrepancy in performance level be-
tween categories was no longer detectable. The fact that the
three AD patients in our sample who showed a significant
disadvantage for living items on the tasks of the intentional
semantic battery had an inter-category priming discrepancy
falling in the range of the NCs, is substantially consistent
with this hypothesis.
The claim that a normal priming is indicative of sub-
stantially spared semantic knowledge is not, however,
universally accepted. In some authors’ opinion (Rapp &
Caramazza, 1993), the same performance pattern, namely,
an impairment on traditional semantic memory tasks but a
normal semantic priming effect, can also be expected if a par-
tial degradation of the semantic representation is assumed.
In connectionist models of semantic memory, retrieval of
a known concept implies activation of a specific pattern of
processing units across the network that represents vari-
ous attributes of that concept (Farah & McClelland, 1991;
Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). On the assumption that
semantically related concepts have similar patterns of acti-
vation, these models make it possible to conceptualise the
facilitation effect that occurs in semantic priming tasks as
resulting from the activation of overlapping patterns of units
(Masson, 1995; Parasuraman & Martin, 1994). In this con-
text, some authors (Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) hypothesise
that damage to stored information in the semantic network
may involve elevation of unit activation thresholds. In this
case, if the presentation of a single stimulus (as in the nam-
ing tasks) is not able to drive the corresponding units above
the threshold activation levels, the presentation of a prime,
sharing several units with the stimulus target, may increase
the activation level of the damaged units to above-threshold
levels and, therefore, may produce a facilitation effect. In
this view, it is possible that the normal priming effect ob-
served in AD patients is due to partially damaged, but not
completely lost, semantic information. This supports the
view (as in the intentional versus automatic access hypoth-
esis) that the dissociation between normal and impaired
semantic performance in AD patients depends on different
kind of tasks adopted to assess their semantic memory.
Recent theories postulating that the degenerative process
in AD pathology does not affect all semantic representation
of a given concept to the same extent provide an alternative
interpretation for our data (Devlin et al., 1998; Gonnerman
et al., 1997; Moss et al., 1998). Based on these theories,
the dissociation in AD patients’ semantic performance may
be an expression of the particular portion of the semantic
representation tapped by the particular task. In the context
of connectionist distributed models of semantic memory, it
has been argued that in a widespread pathology such as AD,
the unique or non-overlapping units of the semantic net-
work are more precociously affected than the overlapping
ones (Parasuraman & Martin, 1994). According to the hy-
pothesis of a priming effect based on the activation of over-
lapping features of two related concepts (Masson, 1995),
normal facilitation can be interpreted as the expression of
preserved functioning of the more resistant portion of the
network in AD patients. On the other hand, since naming
and word-picture matching tasks or tasks probing seman-
tic knowledge about a concept are based on the retrieval of
distinctive information (Devlin et al., 1998), the poor per-
formance of AD patients on these tasks may reflect early
damage to this kind of semantic information.
Better preservation of shared than distinctive semantic
knowledge in our AD patients was documented by their per-
formance on the semantic Questionnaire. Indeed, while AD
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patients’ performance did not significantly differ from that
of NCs on the superordinate questions, which tap a level
of knowledge common to all concepts of a given category,
demented patients scored significantly lower than NCs on
the subordinate questions, which explore knowledge of at-
tributes that allow distinguishing one concept from another
in the same category. The dissociation found between per-
formance accuracy on shared versus distinctive semantic
attributes on the same intentional task (besides that found
between automatic and intentional tasks) suggests that the
performance of AD patients on a particular task is more pre-
dictable in terms of the kind of knowledge investigated than
on the basis of intentional or automatic access to seman-
tic information. The semantic priming paradigm used in the
present study did not allow us to investigate whether integrity
of semantic priming in AD patients is actually a function of
the kind of semantic relationship linking the prime to the
target. However, the results of two recent semantic priming
studies with degenerative demented patients are in keeping
with this view (Moss & Tyler, 1999; Giffard et al., 2002).
The different distribution of shared and distinctive fea-
tures among concept representations belonging to living and
non-living domains has been considered at the base of the
emergence of specific patterns of category deficits during the
course of AD pathology. As previously mentioned, accord-
ing to Devlin et al.’s model (Devlin et al., 1998), in the early
stages of the disease, a relative disadvantage for non-living
things should be expected because these representations are
supported by more vulnerable, distinctive, non-correlated
features. Only later, when a catastrophic loss of whole sets
of shared and correlated attributes of concepts occurs, a re-
versed category effect, that is, poorer performance on liv-
ing than on non-living items is expected. However, different
predictions can be made on the basis of Moss et al.’s (1998)
model. As in Devlin et al.’s model (Devlin et al., 1998), in
this one correlated features are thought to be more resis-
tant to damage because they are sustained by collateral ac-
tivation. However, although Moss and Tyler also posit that
non-living things are represented by more distinctive fea-
tures than living concepts (represented more by shared and
correlated features), in this case the distinctive properties of
non-living things are supposed to be more strongly corre-
lated (and, as a consequence, more resistant to damage) than
the distinctive features of living things. Accordingly, in early
stages of the disease, patients with a diffuse semantic mem-
ory impairment will be particularly poor on the living items
of any test requiring preservation of distinctive knowledge.
Only later, when damage involves the distinctive features of
non-living things and, at the end, when the highly correlated
shared features of both living and non-living domains are
also involved, can a relative advantage for living things be
detected.
Our finding of three AD patients with a prevalent impair-
ment for the living category on the semantic battery and the
absence of such a dissociation on the priming task contrasts
with Gonnerman et al.’s hypothesis (Gonnerman et al., 1997)
of an early prevalent deficit for non-living things. On the
contrary, this result fits well with Moss and Tyler’s predic-
tion (Moss et al., 1998). Indeed, the three AD patients with
a mild level of pathology may have been particularly poor
on the living items of the semantic battery because perfor-
mance on these tasks requires the integrity of distinctive in-
formation which, due to its poor correlation, is supposed to
be most affected in this category. On the other side, if prim-
ing facilitation is based on the activation of patterns of units
that overlap in different concepts, these patients should have
normal priming facilitation in both living and non-living cat-
egories. This is due to the integrity of shared information in
both semantic domains at this stage of the disease.
4.4. Conclusions
Results of the present study show that a disadvantage for
living rather than non-living things can be observed even in
normal subjects. Several factors are likely responsible for
this “physiologic” asymmetry, such as general properties in-
trinsic to individual items and qualitative differences in the
semantic representation of different conceptual categories.
Failure to detect a category-specific semantic deficit in our
sample of AD patients was probably due to the lack of a
prevalent impairment for the living category in most of the
patients studied. This finding is in keeping with previous re-
search showing that category-specific effects may not be a
generalised phenomenon in AD but may pertain to a limited
number of patients (Garrard et al., 1998). Finally, we found
that the category-specific effect could not be confirmed in
a semantic priming paradigm in those AD patients with a
specific impairment for living category on the intentional
semantic tasks. Different hypothesis have been advanced to
explain this result. However, recent findings make us lean
more toward the interpretative framework based on the hy-
potheses maintaining that the variability of performance in
an AD sample depends greatly on the portion of semantic
knowledge explored by the experimental task. Although the
present investigation provides only indirect support for it,
further experimental work, directly investigating this issue
is currently under way in our laboratory.
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